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 “Foreign Policy Views and US Standing in the World” 
 
 Matthew A. Baum and Henry R. Nau 
 
  What do Americans think about the US role in world affairs and why do they think the 
way they do? Americans typically do not think about foreign policy most of the time, and, as a 
consequence, know relatively little about it (Almond 1950, Lippmann 1955, Converse 1964, 
Erskine 1963, Edwards 1983, Sobel 1993, Holsti 2004, Canes-Wrone 2006, Page and Bouton 
2006, Berinsky 2007). While foreign policy issues can become salient when major international 
events (like 9/11 and the Iraq War) arise or when political candidates focus on foreign policy 
(Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989), ceteris paribus, Americans know and care more about 
domestic politics (Delli-Carpini and Keeter 1996, Holsti 1994, Canes-Wrone 2006, Converse 
1964). Consequently, typical Americans are broadly aware of foreign policy, and have some 
available attitudes about it (Page and Bouton 2006, Aldrich et al. 1989). However, except in the 
face of political priming by elites or exogenous shocks, such attitudes may not be broadly 
accessible when making political decisions, like voting. 
 
  What do scholars know about the general attitudes the American public holds toward 
foreign affairs? At least since World War II most Americans have consistently rejected 
isolationism (Kull 2001, Holsti 2004) in favor of robust U.S. engagement with the world. 
Moreover, Americans tend to prefer multilateral over unilateral approaches to foreign policy 
(Page and Bouton 2006, Holsti 2004, Todorov and Mandisodza 2004). Although these attitudes 
appear firm, they disguise substantive subtleties such as the fact that most Americans assume 
that their fellow citizens prefer to act unilaterally (Todorov and Mandisodza 2004) and that 
multilateral policies generally produce results that the U.S. would prefer if it acted unilaterally 
(Stewart and Bennett 1991). 
 
  Scholars know much less about American attitudes toward more specific aspects of world 
affairs, such as US standing in the world. This was the subject of a 2008-09 APSA Task Force 
assembled by APSA President, Peter Katzenstein (Reference Report). The Task Force’s final 
report defines US standing as “an attribute assigned to the United States by other actors such as 
foreign leaders and peoples, international organizations, transnational groups, and of course, 
assessed by American voters” (page reference). Standing in this sense has many aspects but the 
report emphasizes two in particular: credibility and esteem.  
 
  Credibility refers to the U.S. government’s ability to do what it says it is going to do. This 
  dimension captures the reputation, or “standing up,” concerns that have long dominated studies of 
  deterrence as well as U.S. leadership more broadly.  Esteem refers to America’s stature, or 
  “standing for,” for other countries and the American image in international politics.  
 
In other words, the Task Force report defines standing as the assessment of America’s role in the 
world by other countries based on what America does (credibility) and what America is (the 
esteem in which it is held). 
 
  How do Americans assess or think about this concept of standing? Do they care a lot or a 
little about how other countries view America’s role in the world? What influences their views of   2 
US standing? On this question, the most significant statistical finding over time (going back well 
before the Iraq years), illustrated in Figure 1, is the strong link between party identification (ID) 
and assessments of US standing. Republican respondents consistently see US standing as lower 
than Democrats during Democratic administrations, and Democratic respondents consistently see 
US standing as lower than Republicans during Republican administrations. As Peter Trubowitz, 
one of the Task Force leaders, observed in a summary memo in March 2009 (upon reviewing 
Figure 1), “tell me your partisan affiliation and which party controls the presidency, and we can 
predict where you stand on standing (that is, whether you think it’s up or down.)”  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
  Is this association a simple matter of party reflexivity, or does party identification (ID) 
serve as a heuristic for other factors influencing American views of US standing? Do Democrats 
and Republicans think differently about America’s standing in the world because they belong to 
different parties or because they hold different domestic political philosophies 
(liberal/conservative), or perhaps because they hold different foreign policy worldviews (e.g., 
nationalism, realism, neoconservativism or liberal internationalism)? This article explores the 
independent and interactive influence of these three variables – party ID, domestic political 
ideology and foreign policy worldviews – in affecting assessments of US standing by US citizens. 
 
Party ID and Foreign Policy Attitudes 
 
Little research has focused directly on party ID and US standing. Rather, scholars have 
focused primarily on foreign policy attitudes in general. The evidence concerning the influence 
of party ID on foreign policy attitudes is weak. Page and Bouton (2006), for instance, report that 
party identification significantly mediated attitudes for only three of twenty possible U.S. foreign 
policy goals they investigated. Party does tend to be highly correlated with domestic political 
ideology (consistently in the neighborhood of about .40 across 10 Pew Center surveys we 
sampled for this study, conducted between 2001 and 2006). However, Page and Bouton (2006) 
report that once ideology is accounted for, party typically drops out as an influential factor 
mediating Americans’ attitudes regarding U.S. foreign policy goals. 
 
Klinker (2006) reaches a similar conclusion (see also Rauch 2007), arguing that partisan 
differences on foreign policy issues, while sometimes statistically significant, are in most cases 
not particularly large. He finds similar patterns with respect to the “goals” of U.S. foreign policy, 
the “means” of achieving those goals, and Americans’ values, such as patriotism and national 
pride. He reports that the exception to these patterns is ratings of President Bush’s foreign policy, 
where a large partisan gap is apparent. This is consistent with Jacobson (2006), who finds that 
the partisan gap associated with the Iraq War is far larger than for any prior U.S. military 
conflict.
1 This suggests that it is plausible that when a debate regarding American foreign policy 
becomes highly polarized along partisan dimensions, party ID may become more consequential 
as a predictor of individual attitudes on that (and related) foreign policy issue(s). 
  
                                                 
1 Jacobson’s data extend through 2006. By 2008, the partisan gap over Iraq had begun to recede, 
as Republicans turned increasingly pessimistic.   3 
  Busby and Monten (2008) offer some evidence in support of this latter conjecture, 
finding that while Americans have remained predominantly internationalist throughout the post-
WWII era, “parties…have become more ideologically homogenous, more regionally 
concentrated, and more extreme in their voting patterns on foreign policy” (465). They attribute 
this change to a variety of factors, ranging from Vietnam, to the end of the Cold War, to the 
coming to power of legislators in the Republican Party with different sets of foreign policy 
preferences from their predecessors, yet who were elected primarily for their views on domestic 
issues.  
 
Given the relatively weak evidence linking party ID and foreign policy views in general, 
how does one account for the strong link in Figure 1 between party ID and US standing? Perhaps 
party ID is not the principal underlying causal variable. Maybe other factors such as domestic 
political ideology or foreign policy worldviews lurk behind or along side party ID and play a 
stronger role.  
 
Domestic Political Ideology and Foreign Policy Attitudes 
 
The literature offers stronger evidence that political ideology (liberal/conservative) 
influences attitudes toward US foreign policy. The most widely employed model aimed at 
disaggregating American attitudes toward foreign policy consists of the so-called MI/CI index 
(Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1981, Holsti 2004, Holsti and Rosenau 1999, and many others), where 
“MI” and “CI” represent “militant” and “cooperative” internationalism, respectively. (Scholars 
have experimented with a number of variants of this scheme, sometimes adding additional 
dimensions. But none has been as widely employed or influential.) By classifying citizens as 
either supporting or opposing these two types of internationalism, this index yields a 2x2 matrix, 
shown in Figure 2 (from Holsti 2004): 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
  Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1981) defined individuals who support both forms of 
internationalism as “internationalists” and those who oppose both as “isolationists.” Individuals 
who support CI but oppose MI are “accomodationists,” while those who oppose CI and support 
MI are “hard liners.” The percentages shown in the figure represent a sample of the results from 
the first and final installment of the survey battery cited by Holsti. The results indicate that 
significant pluralities of Americans are accommodationists, opposing militant internationalism 
and supporting cooperative internationalism. Conversely, only about one in ten Americans is 
isolationist. While there was some movement between the “hard liner” and “accommodationist” 
categories between 1976 and 1996 – perhaps reflecting the end of the Cold War – the overall 
percentages are more noteworthy for their stability. Indeed, the intervening surveys, conducted 
every four years (not shown), reveal strikingly similar distributions. 
 
The MI-CI index – which the authors derive by coding a series of survey questions 
regarding foreign policy attitudes -- has proven impressively reliable at predicting support or 
opposition to U.S. approaches toward foreign policy in general, and specific policy initiatives in 
particular. For instance, Holsti (2004: 143) reports that accommodationists were about half as 
likely as hard liners to view the U.S. victory in the first Persian Gulf War as “a great victory for   4 
the United States” (45 vs. 83 percent) and over five times as likely to believe that the U.S. “will 
be too ready to use military force and go to war again” (10 vs. 56 percent). 
 
Are these foreign policy attitudes linked to domestic political ideology?  Early research 
(Key 1963, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, Converse 1964) found at most a limited 
relationship between partisanship and ideology, on the one hand, and foreign policy attitudes, on 
the other. Subsequent research (Russett and Hanson 1975, Holsti and Rosenau 1988), however, 
revealed evidence of a relationship between liberal domestic attitudes and dovish international 
preferences, on the one hand, and between conservative domestic attitudes and hawkish 
international preferences, on the other.  
 
In the most recent work, Holsti and others (2004; see also Holsti and Rosenau 1996) find 
a substantial link between foreign policy attitudes as measured by the MI/CI index and domestic 
political ideology. This work defines domestic political ideology along two dimensions: 
economic and social. Respondents’ placements along the two dimensions vary independently for 
each dimension. This yields four types of individuals: liberals (liberal on both dimensions), 
conservatives (conservative on both dimensions), populists (conservative on social issues, liberal 
on economic issues), and libertarians (liberal on social issues and conservative on economic 
issues). Averaging across four surveys conducted between 1984 and 1996, Holsti finds that, by 
this measure, an average of 78% of liberals are accommodationists, who support CI and oppose 
MI, 34% of conservatives are hardliners, and another 41% of conservatives are internationalists. 
In other words, 75% of conservatives support MI, though less than half of those also support CI.  
 
This suggests that there is, in fact, a strong domestic ideological component to foreign 
policy attitudes. Summarizing the most recent research, Ramos and Nincic (2008) conclude that 
“where international affairs are concerned, conservatives are more likely to favor self-regarding 
ends [nationalist] and punitive means [militant internationalism], with liberals more apt to 
endorse other-regarding objectives [internationalist] and policy means based on positive 
incentives [cooperative internationalism].” 
 
Foreign Policy Worldviews and US Standing 
 
  Nevertheless, in studies to date, definitions of both domestic political ideologies and 
foreign policy attitudes are incomplete. Holsti’s two components of domestic ideology – 
economic and social views – exclude a third potentially crucial political component – political 
views toward the relative importance of freedom vs. equality and small or decentralized vs. large 
or centralized government. Similarly, Ramos and Nincic suggest that foreign policy attitudes 
encompass foreign policy goals – self-regarding or nationalist vs. other-regarding or 
internationalist – as well as attitudes towards the use of force – militant internationalism vs. 
cooperative internationalism.  
 
  Could a more complete delineation of foreign policy beliefs better account for the full 
range of Americans’ opinions regarding foreign policy, and especially US standing? In this 
article, we define the independent variables in terms of foreign policy worldviews and the 
dependent variable in terms of US standing.. The concept of foreign policy worldviews suggests 
that Americans may assess US standing through different foreign policy schools of thought.   5 
Some Americans assess standing largely in terms of security threats and power (capabilities or 
what America has); others assess it more in terms of legitimacy, human rights and the like 
(esteem or what American is); still others do so primarily in terms of diplomacy (credibility or 
what America does). How one defines standing determines in large measure whether one sees it 
rising or falling, and whether one considers that rise or decline as important.
2 
 
  For example, American relative power increased in the early 1980s, the onset of the 
“new” Cold War under Ronald Reagan. But American diplomacy was widely criticized around 
the world. Domestic groups that defined US standing largely in terms of American power saw 
US standing as rising. Those that defined it more in terms of approbation of American diplomacy 
saw it as declining.  
 
  Similarly, in recent years American diplomacy has been widely reported as being in ill 
repute. Yet American military power, as least as measured by the overthrow of the Taliban and 
Saddam Hussein regimes, has arguably never been greater. According to Figure 1, Democrats 
seem much more troubled than Republicans by the decline of American diplomacy, while 
Republicans seem more confident than Democrats by the rise in American power.    
 
  Thus the foreign policy worldviews of individuals may be a broad mediating factor 
between domestic political ideology and US standing. When a Democrat is in the White House, 
Republicans disapprove of that administration for domestic ideological reasons but also because 
they distrust the administration’s judgment in foreign affairs, expecting it to behave in ways 
detrimental to American interests and thereby to cause American standing to fall. Republicans 
believe, for example, that Democrats depend too much on diplomacy and too little on force, such 
that threats build up in the world and America’s reputation suffers. Similarly, when a Republican 
is in power, Democrats oppose the administration for domestic ideological reasons but also 
because they distrust that administration’s judgment in foreign affairs, expecting it to use too 
much force and too little diplomacy, increasing terrorism, unilateralism and consequently 
causing America’s standing to fall. 
 
  Some studies define foreign policy worldviews in terms of the idea of American 
exceptionalism (Lipset 1997). They suggest that values of exceptionalism correlate with 
tendencies to expect other countries to emulate US values and, as a consequence, often lead to an 
overestimation of US standing (Davis and Lynn-Jones 1987, Dougal 2001). But other studies 
question whether exceptionalism is central to foreign policy views. They find that American 
exceptionalism is really just another version of American nationalism which makes American 
citizens vulnerable to an “us vs. them” framing by elites (Kohut and Stokes 2006, 2007). 
 
  One reason for the inconclusiveness of these studies may be that Americans do not have a 
single, uniform view of American exceptionalism or foreign policy. Instead, they have several 
distinct ones. Some citizens, for example, adopt liberal internationalist views and tend to think 
that America is exceptional, such that other countries desire to emulate the US, and that 
multilateralism will achieve most of what America seeks in world affairs. They are most likely to 
                                                 
2 Here we include a definition of standing in terms of US power which the APSA Task Force 
excluded or included only in relationship to US credibility (behavior) and esteem (values).   6 
assess standing largely in terms of legitimacy and multilateralism. Others adopt more nationalist 
views and think America is exceptional but see this exceptionalism either as unique making 
Americans more sensitive to threats from abroad (conservative nationalists) or as shared with 
other societies inclining America to listen more and fear less from other societies (liberal 
nationalists). Nationalists are likely to assess US standing in more limited terms, including 
respect abroad for American independence (conservatives) or values (liberal). Still others adopt 
realist views and do not consider America as exceptional at all but ordinary like all other powers.   
Realists assess US standing mostly in terms of America’s security and relative power and see 
anti-Americanism not as a reaction to American exceptionalism but as a reaction to American 
power (defensive realists) or hegemony (offensive realists). Neoconservatism may be the newest 
school of thought, combining the means of offensive realism (assertive rather than defensive 
used of force) with the ends of liberal internationalism (spreading democracy). Neoconservatives 
assess US standing largely in terms of US preparedness to support freedom movements and 
regime change around the world. These traditions are variously labeled but well established in 
the history and study of American foreign policy (see Perkins 1952, Nordlinger 1995, Nau 2002, 
Mead 2002, Jentleson 2007). Table 1 summarizes the four worldviews outlined above. 
 




Two foundational hypotheses follow from the prior discussion. These are as follows: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, typical individuals will view US standing as relatively higher 
when their own party controls the White House than when the other party 
controls the White House. 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, typical individuals’ opinions concerning US standing will 
also (net of party and domestic ideology) be influenced their worldviews.  
 
If research has established that many Americans possess worldviews of the sort identified 
above, and at least sometimes bring them to bear in assessing the merits of U.S. foreign policy 
actions, far less attention has been devoted to exactly which Americans bring such worldviews to 
bear, when they are likely to do so, or why. We undertake an initial foray into answering all three 
questions. To do so, we turn to research on human information processing.  
 
A vast literature in cognitive and political psychology shows that typical individuals rely 
on information shortcuts, or heuristic cues (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Popkin 1994), 
including the opinions of trusted political elites (Iynegar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 
1990; Zaller 1992; Rahn 1993; Larson 1996, 2000) and party ID (Rahn 1993; Popkin 1994; 
Nelson and Garst 2005). Individuals’ interpretations of heuristic cues depend in significant 
measure on their preexisting belief systems (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Herrmann et al. 1997), for 
which party ID is typically an important (Rahn 1993; Popkin 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; 
Groeling 2001; Nelson and Garst 2005) if incomplete (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; 
Holsti 2004) element. The party affiliations of information sources (e.g., elites) and receivers (e.g., 
citizens) in interaction thus serve as a cognitive filter, mediating the selection and implications of   7 
the information shortcuts typical individuals rely on in making political judgments.
3  
 
Party ID is an important heuristic because it is highly accessible. Nearly every adult 
citizen possesses it, and nearly everyone understands its implications, at least in general terms. 
Party ID and its implications are continually reinforced by political elites seeking to maintain the 
value of the party “brand” as a signal representing a set of policies a given candidate will likely 
tend to support or oppose. These factors, in combination, make party ID a “cheap” – that is, 
cognitively easy to employ -- information shortcut, in that merely knowing an individual’s party 
identification communications a great deal of information about their likely social and political 
preferences. 
 
A worldview can also be thought of as an information shortcut, allowing an individual to 
assess the “likely” merits of a policy without necessarily delving into all of its details. However, 
relative to party ID, worldviews are cognitively demanding. They are less universally recognized 
than party ID, less frequently primed or reinforced by elites, and require a great deal more 
information to comprehend or apply to particular circumstances. This makes them more costly to 
employ as a heuristic for assessing a foreign policy activity. It further raises the questions of who 
is likely to employ such a demanding heuristic cue, given the ready availability of cheaper ones, 
and under what circumstances are they likely to do so? 
 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Holsti 2006), we argue that political sophisticates – 
that is, individuals who pay a lot of attention to and understand politics – are more likely than 
political novices – that is, individuals who neither attend to nor understand politics – to employ 
worldview as a heuristic. For the latter individuals, such a heuristic is far too costly and hence 
inefficient. Consequently, political novices seem far more likely to rely on more accessible and 
simple heuristics, like party ID. A hypothesis follows. 
 
H3: Political novices will tend to rely less on worldview than on partisanship in 
assessing U.S. standing. 
 
Conversely, political sophisticates possess both the means and, in all likelihood, the 
motivation, to employ the more demanding heuristic of foreign policy worldview. After all, if the 
goal is to assess the relative merits of a foreign policy activity, then one is likely to do a better job 
by employing a heuristic that carries with it a great deal of topically pertinent information. The 
more general, catch-all “brand” of party ID is simply less apt for this purpose. A second 
hypothesis follows. 
 
H4: Politically sophisticated individuals will rely more on worldview than political 
novices in assessing U.S. standing. 
 
That said, if human beings are cognitive misers, expending the minimum necessary effort 
to reach the appropriate decision (Zaller 1992), then it seems unlikely that even political 
sophisticates would always elect to employ a cognitively demanding heuristic. Rather, they seem 
                                                 
3 For an investigation into the effects of partisan cues on post-9/11 public opinion on U.S. foreign 
policy, see Hindman (2004).   8 
likely to prefer to match the complexity and precision of the heuristic to the task at hand. That is, 
if there is significant doubt about the merits of a policy, then it is more likely to be “worth” the 
effort of a sophisticate to employ a complex heuristic. Conversely, if there is relatively little doubt 
about a policy, then a simpler heuristic, like party ID, may suffice. 
 
How can we anticipate, ex ante, when sophisticates are likely to favor a more high 
demand/high precision heuristic (worldview) over a more low demand/low precision one (party 
ID)? One obvious answer concerns the ex ante probability that a given individual will be inclined 
to support or oppose a given foreign policy activity. The partisanship of the president, relative to 
that of the respondent, can play an important role in such an assessment. American’s support their 
own party’s presidents in extremely high numbers. From the Eisenhower to the George W. Bush 
Administrations, an average of over 80% of presidents’ fellow partisans have approved of their 
job performance, compared to only 49% of opposition partisans. This suggests that partisans – 
including sophisticated partisans -- are highly likely ex ante to assume, absent information to the 
contrary, that their fellow partisan presidents will pursue policies, including foreign policies, 
consistent with their own preferences. Hence, party ID – that of the citizen relative to that of the 
president -- is a sufficient heuristic when a political sophisticate shares the partisanship of the 
president. However, when the opposition party holds the presidency, then a political sophisticate 
is unlikely to be willing to assume that the president’s policies are consonant with his or her own 
interests.  
 
That said, given the relatively less distinct, unidimensional ideological lines in foreign, 
relative to domestic politics (which arguably gave rise to the notion, however exaggerated, that 
“politics stops at the water’s edge”), sophisticates may not be inclined to simply rely on party ID 
and assume that he or she should oppose the foreign policy of an opposing party’s president. The 
reason is that partisanship is likely to offer a less clear signal, all else equal, in foreign relative to 
domestic policy, as Americans tend to know and care less about the latter (see previous citations). 
This makes it easier for politicians, and thus provides them a greater incentive, to prime domestic 
political issues in partisan terms. Along these lines, Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida (1989) found 
that domestic issues were more salient to Americans than foreign policy issues in a majority of 
U.S. presidential elections, even during the Cold War.  
 
By contrast, on foreign policy matters, political sophisticates may seek to ground their 
objections to the incumbent president in the logic of foreign policy worldviews rather than pure 
partisanship. They may feel obliged to present an opposition or alternative foreign policy view to 
that of the incumbent administration. In this circumstance, such individuals might conclude that it 
is worth the cost to employ the more demanding cognitive heuristic of worldview. By doing so, 
they can more accurately determine whether they ought to support or oppose the president’s 
foreign policy initiatives. Two final hypotheses follow: 
 
H5: Political sophisticates from the presidential party will assess U.S. standing primarily 
based on the party affiliation of the president, and be inclined to hold a more positive 
view of U.S. standing than their opposing party counterparts. Under such 
circumstances worldviews will have less influence than party on assessments of U.S. 
standing. 
   9 
H6: Political sophisticates will assess U.S. standing in part based on their personal 
worldviews when the president does not share their partisanship. 
 
Below, we analyze four different datasets to explore the effects of the aforementioned 
worldviews on U.S. standing, independently and in combination with one another. This allows us 
to test our six hypotheses against multiple, independently derived operationalizations of our 
independent and dependent variables, thereby, we hope, making it possible to support our 
argument more strongly than would be possible through any single empirical test. Unfortunately, 
available survey questions limited our ability to test consistently all four sets of worldviews. In 
the first analysis below, we investigate all four worldviews, but in the subsequent three we 
collapse the four views into a linear scale with nationalists at one end, realists and neocons in the 
middle, and liberal internationalists at the other end. 
 
Pew Center 2004 Survey   
 
The Pew Center conducted a broad survey on Americans’ attitudes toward foreign policy in 
July 2004, a time during which the war in Iraq dominated public opinion regarding foreign 
policy. Our analysis of this study tests H1, H2, H4.  
 
In this survey, respondents’ party ID and political ideology correlated significantly with 
attitudes toward Iraq. Based on a six-question scale we constructed (see Table A3 in the 
Appendix), party and ideology correlated with attitudes toward the Iraq war at -.68 and -.41 
respectively (see Table 2), indicating, unsurprisingly, that liberals and Democrats are less 
supportive of the war than conservatives or Republicans. In other words, if we assume that party 
ID and ideology precede attitudes toward Iraq (as seems likely for most individuals), then 
political partisanship, and to a somewhat lesser extent ideology, are extremely strong predictors 
of attitudes toward the Iraq War. (Table A3 lists the question wording and coding of the six items 
included in the Iraq attitudes scale.) We also considered the influence of party and ideology on 
worldviews, as well as that of worldviews on attitudes toward Iraq. Table 2 also presents these 
correlations. We measured worldviews based on scales delineated in Tables 3 and 4 below. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
While Table 2 reveals an extremely strong relationship between party and support for 
Iraq, and a fairly strong relationship between ideology and support for Iraq, the relationships 
between these three variables, on the one hand, and worldviews, on the other, are with one 
exception substantially weaker. The exception is neoconservatives. The neoconservative scale 
correlates with the Iraq support scale, ideology, and party at .57, -.36, and -.44, respectively. This 
indicates that neoconservatives are far more likely than other respondents to support the Iraq War, 
as well as substantially less likely to be ideologically liberal or affiliated with the Democratic 
party. Overall, these correlations suggest that – again with a partial exception among 
neoconservatives – party and political ideology account only modestly for worldview (measured 
on a right-to-left continuum). In short, worldview seems to be influenced by, but vary 
independently from, party and ideology. 
    10 
To isolate the significance of worldviews from the partisan salience of Iraq, we next 
undertook a more systematic regression analysis of these data. We controlled for Iraq attitudes 
(as well as other variables such as party ID, ideology, interest in politics and socio-economic 
characteristics). Our model thus included a series of questions (shown in Table A1) from which 
we constructed indexes for each of the above-referenced worldviews (see Table A2), as well as a 
two-part question that we employed to measure attitudes toward U.S. standing.  
 
Beginning with the latter, we constructed a dummy variable coded 1 if respondents 
believed the U.S. was, at the time of the survey, “LESS respected by other countries…as [than] it 
has been in the past” and if, in a follow-on question, they indicated that they considered this “a 
major problem” and 0 otherwise.
4 The two questions were as follows: 
 
Q43: Compared with the past, would you say the U.S. is MORE respected by 
other countries these days, LESS respected by other countries, or AS 
respected as it has been in the past? (Coded: 1=More respected, 2=Less 
respected, 3=As respected as in the past, and 9=Don’t know/Refused). 
 
Q.43a:ASK IF LESS RESPECTED (2 IN Q.43) Do you think less respect for 
America is a major problem a minor problem or not a problem at all? 
{new} (Coded: 1=Major problem, 2=Minor problem,  3=Not a problem, 
and 9=Don’t know/Refused). 
 
Turning to worldviews, here we employed responses to seven questions (including 
several multi-part questions). Table A1 in the Appendix lists each question. Table A2 then 
categorizes responses according to which worldview they represent in our scales. To create our 
four worldview scales, we normalized each item in Table A1 to a 0-1 interval and then summed 
all items within each worldview category. This produced four separate scales, based on differing 
numbers of elements. Hence to standardize the four scales, we separately normalized each one to 
a 0-1 interval. 
 
We expected, per H2, that in Summer 2004, liberal internationalists would be most likely 
to see respect for America declining and that this constituted a major problem, while 
neoconservatives – with the largest ideological stake in the Iraq conflict – would be least likely 
to hold this view. Realists and nationalists, we anticipated, would fall somewhere in between, 
with realists perhaps being somewhat more concerned than nationalists. The results, summarized 
in Table 3, generally, albeit imperfectly, support our expectations, thereby suggesting that 
respondents’ worldviews do indeed matter when they are asked to assess U.S. standing.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
                                                 
4 We experimented with a variety of operationalizations of this U.S. standing indicator, including 
variants that exploited the full scales or included responses to Q43a of “minor problem” as 
equivalent to “major problem.” Based on these preliminary analyses, we found that primary 
threshold point appeared to be between respondents who did or did not believe that “less respect” 
was a “major problem.” Hence, we employ the above-described operationalization in our final 
models.   11 
As Table 3 shows, moving from the lowest to highest score on the liberal internationalist 
scale is associated with a 49 percentage point increase in the probability of believing that the U.S. 
is less respected (than before 2004) and that this is a major problem (p<.01). This represents by 
far the largest effect across the four worldview groups. Also as anticipated, neoconservatives 
occupy the opposite extreme. A maximum increase on the neoconservative worldview scale is 
associated with a 3.4 percentage point decline in the probability of believing that the U.S. is less 
respected (than before 2004) and that this is a major problem (p<.05). Nationalists and realists, 
also as anticipated, fall in between. A maximum increase on the nationalist and realist scales are 
associated with 33 and 13 percentage point increases, respectively, in the probability of believing 
that the U.S. is less respected and that this is a major problem (p<.01 for the nationalist scale and 
p<.05 for the realist scale). These results are largely consistent with H2. 
 
The relatively stronger effect among nationalists, relative to realists, was somewhat 
surprising, perhaps owing to a backlash against the changing Bush Administration rationale for 
the war in Iraq. Initially, the administration presented the war as an act of self-defense, aimed at 
protecting the U.S. from Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. As the search for 
Saddam’s WMD dragged on with no evidence emerging that Iraq possessed such weapons, the 
Administration increasingly characterized the conflict as aimed at promoting democracy both in 
Iraq and across the Middle East. While the defense motive may have appealed to nationalists and 
realists, the democracy motive most likely did not. And one might anticipate a stronger negative 
reaction among nationalists, for whom the value of “democracy promotion,” especially if it 
involves costs, is most anathema. 
 
In order to further isolate the effects of worldviews, and thereby test H4, we undertook a 
second analysis, this time adding an interaction with political attentiveness. The goal is to see 
whether we observe stronger or weaker distinctions across the worldview groups among 
respondents who are more engaged with political issues (both foreign and domestic).
5 To test the 
effect of political attentiveness on these results, we created a political interest scale based on the 
following 6-part question from the Pew (2004) survey:  
 
Q3: As I read each item, tell me if you happened to follow this news story very closely, 
fairly closely, not too closely, or not at all closely: 
  a.  News about candidates for the 2004 presidential election 
  b.  News about the current situation in Iraq  
  c.  John Edwards, the Democratic vice presidential candidate  
  d.  Ethnic violence in Sudan 
  e.  Saddam Hussein’s recent court appearance in Iraq 
  f.  The release of Michael Moore’s movie “Fahrenheit 9/11”  
 
We coded each response on a four-point scale, where 1=not at all closely, 2=not very 
closely, 3=fairly closely, and 4=very closely. We then normalized each response to a 0-1 interval 
and summed the six items, thereby forming a 6-category scale, where a score of 0 indicated that 
the respondent reported not having followed any of the six issues at all, and a score of 6 
indicated that the respondent reported having followed all six issues “very closely.” 
                                                 
5 Ideally we would employ political sophistication, rather than attentiveness. Unfortunately, the 
necessary questions for doing so are unavailable in this survey.   12 
 
Broadly consistent with H4, the findings clearly indicate that attentiveness to politics mediates 
the effects of worldview on attitudes regarding U.S. standing in a largely intuitive manner. Table 
4 presents the probabilities for all four worldview groups of believing the U.S. is less respected 
than in the past and that this is a major problem, as attentiveness to political issues moves from 
its lowest to highest values.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The results suggest that for liberal internationalists and realists, but not for 
neoconservatives or nationalists, greater attentiveness is associated with a significantly higher 
probability of expressing concern over U.S. standing. Among liberal internationalists and realists, 
increased attentiveness is associated with nearly identical increases of 79 and 78 percentage 
points, respectively, in the probability of believing the U.S. is less respected than in the past 
(circa 2004) and that this is a major problem (p<.10 in the former case and p<.05 in the latter). 
Consistent with our expectations, the corresponding effects among neoconservatives and 
nationalists run in the opposing direction: decreases of 26 and 28 percentage points, respectively. 
However, these latter effects are statistically insignificant and hence of questionable substantive 
meaning. Nevertheless, taken together, these results generally follow our expectations. As we 
further develop below, we would expect Democratic political sophisticates who are more likely 
to hold liberal internationalist and some realist views and who are in opposition in 2004 to use 
those views to assess U.S. standing, while Republican political sophisticates who are more likely 
to hold nationalist and neoconservative views and whose president holds office in 2004 would 
rely more on party heuristics and not apply worldviews to assess U.S. standing’  
 
1996 vs. 2004 American National Election Studies (ANES) Analysis 
 
While ANES includes consistent questions about party ID and U.S. standing from 1958 
on, it includes relatively few other questions that could be coded to worldviews over this same 
period of time. Of eleven questions we identified that could be coded in terms of worldviews, 
only six were available across multiple administrations, allowing us to investigate the effects of 
variations in partisan control of the presidency (Democrat Bill Clinton in 1996 and Republican 
George W. Bush in 2004). These six questions are listed in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
 
To measure U.S. standing, the best question available to us in the ANES surveys was the 
following “During the past year, would you say that the United States' position in the world has 
grown weaker, stayed about the same, or has it grown stronger?” (VCF9045).
6 To investigate 
the effects of worldview, political knowledge, ideology, and party ID on perceptions of U.S. 
standing (based on the above question regarding the U.S. “position in the world”), we first 
                                                 
6 Notice that this question about “weak” and “strong” elicits a response about America’s relative 
power, whereas the question in the 2004 Pew survey elicits a response as to whether or not the 
United States is “more or less respected”. Respect may relate to America’s power but it may also 
relate to its values or leadership/diplomacy. This example suggests the difficulties created for 
studies such as ours by the inconsistent wording and ambiguous interpretation of questions in the 
survey data,   13 
created a scale from the aforementioned six questions – each normalized to a 0-1 interval, with 
liberal internationalist at the low end, realists in the middle and nationalists/neoconservatives at 
the high end. (The ANES did not include sufficiently varied questions to allow us to develop 
four distinct categories of worldviews. Hence, as noted earlier, we were forced to collapse the 
several worldviews into a single scale.) 
 
We then interacted the liberal internationalist-to-nationalist scale with political 
knowledge (based on the interviewer’s assessment in the post-election wave) and self reported 
party ID, political ideology and/or a dummy for the George W. Bush (versus Bill Clinton) 
presidency. We tested a variety of control variables, ultimately including only those that proved 




The dependent variable for this analysis is a 3-category scale, where 0=US position has 
grown weaker, .5=stayed about the same, and 1=grown stronger. Table 5 presents the results 
from a series of ordered logit analyses of the effects of party, ideology, political knowledge, the 
president in office, and worldviews on attitudes regarding the U.S. position in the world. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The results suggest some influence of each of these factors, including worldview, on 
assessment of U.S. standing. However, the influence of worldview is heavily mediated by 
partisanship, ideology, and political knowledge. To begin with, consistent with H2, H3 and H4, 
variations in worldview matter far more among politically knowledgeable respondents than 
among less knowledgeable ones. Looking at the top two sections of Table 5, we see that whether 
we interact political knowledge with partisanship or ideology, we find in every instance -- 
liberals and Democrats, on the one hand, and conservatives and Republicans, on the other –that 
the gap in attitudes on U.S. standing between liberal internationalists and nationalists is far more 
stark (by 300 to 500%) among high knowledge respondents than among less knowledgeable ones. 
For instance, among less knowledgeable Republicans (Section 1 in Table 5), liberal 
internationalists were, on average, 15 percentage points less likely than nationalists to believe 
that the U.S. is weaker than in the past. The corresponding gap is nearly three times higher (42 
percentage points) among high knowledge Republican respondents (p<.01 in every case). The 
relationships among Democrats (in Section 2 of Table 5) are similar, as are those when we 
substitute ideology for partisanship (Sections 3 and 4 in Table 5, for conservatives and liberals, 
respectively). These relationships support H3 and H4, while the overall importance of worldview, 
even after controlling for ideology and party is consistent with H2. However, they move in an 
arguably counterintuitive direction, as we anticipated that nationalists would most likely be more 
sanguine about U.S. standing than liberal internationalists. 
 
This begs the question of “why” liberal internationalists should necessarily be less likely 
than nationalists to view the U.S. as weaker than in the past. The answer emerges when we take 
                                                 
7 We tested models including such additional controls as external efficacy, ethnicity, income, 
marital status, religiosity, geographic location. None were statistically significant or materially 
affected the reported results.   14 
the partisanship of the president into account. The fifth through eighth sections of Table 5 
replace the political information interaction term with a dummy variable for the Bush 
Administration (coded 0 in 1996, when President Clinton was in office and 1 in 2004, during 
President Bush’s term in office). The fifth and sixth sections interact the presidency dummy with 
worldview and partisanship (Republicans and Democrats, respectively), while the seventh and 
eighth sections substitute ideology for partisanship (conservatives and liberals, respectively). 
 
The results indicate that in 1996, with a Democrat in the White House, variations in 
worldview heavily mediated attitudes regarding U.S. standing among Republicans and 
conservatives, but not among liberals and Democrats. Among conservatives in 1996, moving 
from liberal internationalist to nationalist/neoconservative worldviews is associated with a 51 
percentage point increase in the probability of believing the U.S. is weaker in the past (p<.01). 
The corresponding increase among Republicans is 31 percentage points (p<.10). No statistically 
significant relationships emerge for either liberals or Democrats during the Clinton 
Administration (in 1996). 
 
In stark contrast, in 2004, during the Bush Administration, nearly the precise opposite 
pattern emerges. In this case, worldviews strongly influence perceptions of U.S. standing among 
liberals and Democrats, but not among conservatives and Republicans. Among Democrats in 
2004, moving from liberal internationalist to realist worldviews is associated with a 63 
percentage point decline in the probability of believing the U.S. is weaker than in the past 
(p<.01). Among liberals, the corresponding decline in the probability of believing the U.S. is 
weaker than in the past is 33 percentage points. However, this last relationship is statistically 
insignificant and hence must be viewed as merely suggestive. No substantively meaningful or 
statistically significant effects of worldviews emerge among conservatives or Republicans during 
the Bush Administration. 
 
These findings support H1, and place the initial results of earlier models employing the 
political knowledge interaction into a quite different context. It appears that nearly all of the 
variations in the effects of worldviews among conservatives and Republicans emerge among 
high knowledge respondents during the Clinton era, while nearly all of the effects among liberals 
and Democrats emerge among high knowledge respondents during the Bush era.  As a test of the 
face validity of these patterns, Table 6 presents the simple correlations between believing the U.S. 
is weaker than in the past and worldview among respondents with differing partisan affiliations 
and ideologies, during the Clinton and Bush Administrations (1996 and 2004, respectively).  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
The results complement those from the ordered logit analysis. During the Clinton era, the 
correlation between worldview and attitudes toward U.S. standing are nearly twice as high 
among Republicans as among Democrats and three times stronger among conservatives relative 
to liberals. The positive signs indicate that stronger nationalist views are associated with 
believing the U.S. is weaker than in the past. Conversely, during the Bush era, the directions of 
the correlations reverse signs, and the relative magnitudes again reverse. In this case, the 
correlations are 11 times stronger for Democrats than Republicans and eight times stronger for 
liberals relative to conservatives. Once again, these results are consistent with H1.   15 
 
Though the ultimate cause of these distinctions is uncertain, one plausible explanation is 
that, for respondents, partisanship and ideology switch on and off the application of worldviews 
to evaluations of U.S. standing. In other words, as H5 and H6 anticipate, when the president and 
the respondent share party or ideological affiliation, the respondent switches off the application 
of worldview and is inclined to trust the president’s judgment ex ante. He or she is willing to rely 
upon the simple heuristic of party or ideological loyalty in assessing the implications of that 
president’s foreign policy for U.S. standing. In other words, if “my party” is in power, then my 
default position is likely to be to assume that U.S. standing is improving. In these situations, 
respondents will likely discount (switch off) the more cognitively demanding heuristic of 
worldview. 
 
However, when the president is from the opposing party, respondents at varying levels of 
political knowledge will tend to be suspicious of the president’s handling of foreign policy and 
its implications for U.S. standing. Table 5 suggests that less knowledgeable respondents – who 
tend to lack fully formed worldviews – may continue to rely, relatively more than their highly 
knowledgeable counterparts, upon the relatively simple heuristic of partisan affiliation. However, 
more politically knowledgeable respondents – who are more likely to possess a coherent 
worldview -- will be more likely than low knowledge individuals to employ the more cognitively 
demanding heuristic of worldview in order to either validate their ex ante distrust of the president, 
or perhaps to assess his performance more carefully and critically than they would if the 
president shared their political leanings (in which case they would simply give the president “the 
benefit of the doubt”). 
 
To more directly test H5 and H6, we undertake separate analyses of the three-way 
interactions between worldview, party (or ideology) and political knowledge during the Bush 
and Clinton presidencies. To the extent the above conjecture is correct, we would anticipate the 
strongest effects of worldviews to emerge among high knowledge Republicans and conservatives 
during the Clinton Administration and among high knowledge Democrats and liberals during the 
Bush years. While party and ideology ought to demonstrate similar effects, we might anticipate 
somewhat stronger relationships when we parse the data by partisanship, relative to when we do 
so by ideology. The reason is simply that party ID represents a more unambiguous heuristic 
allowing citizens to directly compare their presumed interests with those of the president.
8 In fact, 
as Table 7 indicates, this is precisely what we find.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
In 1996, we observe substantively modest and at best marginally statistically significant 
effects of worldviews among low knowledge respondents of both parties, albeit especially weak 
relationships among Democrats. Conversely, among high knowledge respondents, we find no 
significant worldview effects among Democrats, but large and highly significant effects among 
                                                 
8 For instance, while most Americans presumably know their own party affiliation and that of the 
president with near (if not total) certainty, this may not be as universally true for ideology. After 
all, while there has been much debate over how liberal or conservative President’s Clinton and 
Bush were, there is no debate concerning their party affiliation.   16 
Republicans. In the case of Republicans, moving from liberal internationalist to nationalist 
worldviews is associated with a 54 percentage point decline in the probability of believing that 
the U.S. is stronger than in the past and a 28 point increase in the probability of believing that 
the U.S. is weaker than in the past (p<.10 in both cases). The pattern is precisely reversed during 
the Bush Administration (in 2004). Here, we observe no significant effects of worldviews among 
either low-knowledge respondents or high-knowledge Republicans, but highly significant effects 
among high knowledge Democrats. Among this last group, moving from liberal internationalist 
to nationalist worldviews is associated with a decrease of about 66 percentage points in the 
probability of believing the U.S. is weaker than in the past and a 65 percentage point increase in 
the probability of believing the U.S. is stronger than in the past (p<.01 in both cases).  
 
The patterns among liberals and conservatives are similar to those among partisans, albeit 
modestly weaker, as predicted by the more direct correspondence of party ID for the respondent 
relative to the president (and hence its likely stronger heuristic value). During the Clinton 
Administration, among high knowledge conservatives but not among liberals or low knowledge 
conservatives, moving from liberal internationalist to nationalist is associated with a large (83 
percentage point) decline in the probability of believing the U.S. is stronger than in the past. 
During the Bush Administration, no significant relationships emerge among conservatives, while 
highly knowledgeable liberals are more strongly influenced by worldviews than their less 
knowledgeable counterparts. However, in this last instance the effects for high knowledge 
liberals, though far larger in magnitude than those for low knowledge liberals are not statistically 
significant. Nonetheless, taken together, and with this one partial exception, these results appear 
to offer fairly clear evidence in support of our conjecture. These results offer fairly strong 
support for H5 and H6. 
 
2008 ANES Analysis 
 
We turn next to a replication of the above ANES findings, based on the 2008 ANES 
study. Because this is a cross-sectional analysis, we cannot replicate our cross-partisan findings 
from the prior analysis. Hence, we can only partially test hypotheses concerning the partisanship 
of the respondent relative to that of the president. Moreover, in 2008 there was a near universal 
consensus among Americans that U.S. standing was on the decline – albeit less so regarding the 
reasons for that decline. Indeed, only 7.5% of respondents reported believing that the U.S. 
position in the world had grown stronger over the prior year, compared to over 65% who 
reported believing the U.S. position had grown weaker. Consequently, it is more difficult to find 
statistically significant variation on our key causal variables in this context. Nonetheless, we 
anticipate finding at least some evidence consistent with our predictions even in this demanding 
political (and hence data) environment. 
 
Unlike the prior analysis, in which we employed the interviewer’s estimate of 
respondents’ levels of political information as our indicator of political awareness (Zaller 1985, 
Baum 2002, 2003), in this instance we were able to develop an arguably superior measure by 
combining the political information indicator with the interviewer’s assessment of respondents’ 
level of intelligence. This allows us to better capture both knowledge and understanding of 
politics, which Zaller (1992) identifies as the two critical elements of political awareness. In   17 
statistical testing, the combined indicator consistently outperformed the original political 
awareness indicator, which relied solely on political information.
9 
 
Table 8 presents the results of a logit analysis employing the identical dependent variable 
as in the 1996 and 2004 ANES analyses in the prior section. In Table 9, we employ Clarify – 
statistical simulation software developed by King et al. (2000) -- to transform the results into 
expected probabilities (as well as derive confidence intervals) that respondents believe the U.S. 
position in the world has grown stronger over the prior year. 
 
[Tables 8 and 9 here] 
 
The first noteworthy pattern in Table 9, shown in the bottom section of the table, is that 
Republicans are consistently and statistically significantly (from p<.05 to p<.15, depending on 
political sophistication and worldview) more likely than Democrats – by anywhere from about 5 
to 13.5 percentage points, depending on political sophistication and worldview – to believe the 
U.S. position in the world had strengthened over the prior year. Give the presence of a 
Republican in the White House, this result is precisely what H1 would predict.  
 
These same results generally support H3. Among political novices, the effects of 
variations in political partisanship are far larger than the effects of variations in worldview. 
Among these respondents, the effects of two standard deviation shifts in worldview are tiny 
(ranging from zero to two percentage points) and statistically insignificant regardless of party. In 
contrast, the effects of variations in party are substantially larger and in one of two instances 
statistically significant (5.3 points for low-sophistication liberal internationalists and 8.7 points, 
significant at p<.10, among low-sophistication nationalists). 
 
Table 9 also offers support, to varying degrees, for H2 and H4. Looking at the top section 
of Table 9, we can see that, as noted above, among the least politically sophisticated respondents 
variations in worldview have no statistically significant effect on perceptions of the U.S. position 
in the world, regardless of party. However, among the most highly sophisticated respondents, 
worldviews do appear to matter. Among Democrats, a two standard deviation movement from 
liberal internationalist toward nationalist – from one standard deviation below to one standard 
deviation above the overall mean on the scale – is associated with a 2.8 percentage point increase 
in the probability of believing that the U.S. position in the world had grown stronger over the 
prior year (p<.10). Among Republicans, the corresponding change is a 5.8 point decrease in the 
likelihood of believing the U.S. position in the world had grown stronger p<.10). Finally, among 
Independents, the same shift in worldview is associated with a nearly significant (p<.15) 4.2 
point decrease in the likelihood of believing the U.S. position in the world had grown stronger 
over the prior year. These results are clearly consistent with H2 and H4, while being arguably 
somewhat less so with H5 and H6, as variations in worldview here appear to matter slightly more 
for sophisticated Republicans (the presidential party in 2008), relative to sophisticated 
Democrats (the opposition party in 2008).  
                                                 
9 Nonetheless, the results do largely replicate with both operationalizations of political awareness. 
We believe the combined indicator is conceptually superior. Hence, we report results employing 
that variable.   18 
 
This latter difference is not statistically significant, and in all likelihood represents a floor 
effect. As indicated earlier, very few respondents overall (7.5%) – including 14.2% of 
Republicans and 4.8% of Democrats -- in Fall 2008 believed the U.S. position in the world had 
strengthened over the prior year. The fact that nearly three times as many Republicans as 
Democrats believed the U.S. position in the world had strengthened over the prior year may 
account for the somewhat larger effects observed among Republicans. 
 
2008 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) 
 
Our final investigation employs data from the 2008 CCAP, conducted by 
YouGov/Polimetrix. We employ two waves of this panel study, conducted in January and 
October 2008. For our dependent variable in this analysis, we employ the following question:  
 
“Which comes closest to your view: (1) America’s standing in the world has 
fallen because of things America has done; (2) America’s standing in the world 
has fallen but NOT because of anything that America has done; (3) America’s 
standing in the world is about the same as it was 10 years ago; (4) America’s 
standing in the world is better than it was 10 years ago.”
10 
 
Our first key causal variable is a scale, similar to that employed in our ANES analyses, 
that runs from liberal internationalism at the low end to nationalism at the high end, with realism 
and neoconservatism roughly in between. We constructed the scale based on the questions and 
coding shown in Table A5 in the Appendix. 
 
The second key causal variable measures respondents’ political knowledge, based on a 
series of factual knowledge questions. First, the survey asked respondents if they knew whether a 
set of individuals were currently members of the House of Representatives, the Senate, or not 
members of Congress. These individuals included: Nancy Pelosi, Robert Gates, Denis Kucinic, 
Ted Kennedy, and Patrick Leahy.
11 We summed up the correct responses and then normalized 
the resulting score to a 0-1 interval. The survey also asked respondents if they knew the current 
job of Condaleeza Rice, and if they knew whether the U.S. dollar had strengthened or weakened 
over the prior year. We awarded one point for each correct response. We then added the three 
elements together to form a 0-3 scale, where 3 represents maximum political knowledge. 
 
Our final key causal variable is the respondents’ party identification, which we divided 
into three dummy variables, one each for Republicans, Democrats, and Independents/Other party 
affiliations (including Independent leaners). We then interacted all three key causal variables in 
order to separately assess the effects of worldviews on different partisan subgroups at differing 
                                                 
10 Notice that this definition of standing elicits a response about America’s behavior – what it has 
done – and about America’s position, that is its relative power or values, unrelated to what it has 
done.  
11 Additional individuals were included in the list. But these five were asked of the largest 
number of respondents, and hence focusing on them allowed us to maximize our N.   19 
levels of political knowledge. We also include controls for respondents’ political ideology (a 5-
point liberal-to-conservative scale), level of education, and gender.  
 
In order to separately estimate the probability of selecting each of the response categories 
of the dependent variable, we employ multinomial logit, which does not assume that the several 
categories are scaled in any manner. Finally, it is worth noting that in order to preserve the 
appropriate direction of causality, to the extent possible, we take the dependent variable from the 
October wave and the key causal variables from the January wave. (The controls are taken from 
whichever wave included the least missing data.) Table 10 presents the results of our 
multinomial logit analysis. Table 11 then transforms the key coefficients into probabilities, again 
employing Clarify.
12 
 [Tables 10 and 11 here] 
 
Beginning with H1, the results shown in the bottom half of Table 11 offer clear support 
for our hypotheses. In nearly every case, regardless of worldview or political sophistication, 
Republicans are more likely than Democrats to view U.S. standing as either the same or better 
than 10 years prior, and less likely to view it as having fallen. Among low-information liberal 
internationists, Republicans are 15.3 percentage points more likely than Democrats to believe 
that U.S. standing is better or the same than 10 years prior. Among low- and high-information 
realists, the corresponding differences are 79.4  and 1.45 points, respectively. High information 
liberal internationalists are the sole (partial) exception, as the direction of the gap here reverses, 
albeit by only 1.6 points. 
 
The top half of Table 11, in turn, offers support, albeit to somewhat varying degrees, for 
H2, H3, and H4. In over half of the comparisons shown in the table, including nearly every 
instance among highly sophisticated respondents, variations in worldview are associated with 
statistically significant differences in attitudes toward U.S. standing. This supports H2. Moreover, 
consistent with H4, the relationships are far stronger among political sophisticates. Among these 
respondents, worldview exerts a statistically significant influence on the probability of holding a 
given opinion regarding U.S. standing in 10 of 12 possible comparisons (4 possible attitudes 
toward standing x 3 partisan subgroups). These differences range from a low of about nine 
percentage points to a high of over 78 points. Moreover, in every instance the directions of the 
differences are consistent with intuition. That is, liberal internationalists are significantly more 
likely to believe that U.S. standing fell during the Bush years because of America’s actions, 
while nationalists are more likely to agree that it fell, but not because of anything America did. 
These gaps are also larger among sophisticates than among novices in five of six comparisons (3 
partisan subgroups x 2 worldviews). 
 
The results offer fairly strong support for H3 as well. The bottom half of Table 11 
indicates that among liberal internationalists, variations in partisanship are associated with 
statistically distinct effects on attitudes toward standing in only one of eight possible 
                                                 
12 For independents in Table 11, it was necessary to vary political sophistication from just 
slightly above minimum (.1, instead of 0) to maximum, as the results became implausible when 
sophistication was set to 0, presumably due to the small number of respondents located at the 
lowest levels of political sophistication.   20 
comparisons (2 political sophistication groups x 4 possible attitudes regarding standing). 
However, the magnitudes of the gaps between the parties are larger among low-sophistication 
respondents in three of four possible comparisons (that is, attitudes toward standing). Because 
these differences are insignificant, however, they must be interpreted as at most suggestive. 
 
Among nationalists, the results are more unambiguously supportive of the hypothesis. 
Less sophisticated respondents here vary far more than their more sophisticated counterparts as 
their partisanship varies. Among low-sophistication respondents, variations in party are 
associated with statistically significant differences in the probability of holding a given attitude 
regarding standing in three of four possible instances (worse because of U.S. actions, worse, but 
not because of U.S. actions, same, better). The differences here are quite large in magnitude, 
ranging from 33 to 81 percentage points, with low-sophistication Democrats far more likely than 
low-sophistication Republicans to believe U.S. standing has fallen, either because of U.S. actions 
or not, and far less likely to believe U.S. standing is the same as 10 years prior. In contrast, 
among high sophistication realists, the magnitudes of the effects of differences in party are 
smaller in every instance – dramatically so in three of four cases – and statistically significant in 
only one case (belief that U.S. standing has fallen because of America’s actions). 
 
The results are ambiguous for H5 and H6. Consistent with the latter hypothesis, 
Democratic political sophisticates (the opposition party in 2008) do, in these data, appear to base 
their attitudes regarding U.S. standing in significant measure on their worldviews (see top half of 
Table 11). However, contrary to H5, so too do Republican sophisticates. Moreover, in two of 
four comparisons, the effects of worldviews are larger in magnitude among Republicans. This 
latter result may be an artifact of the timing of the survey, as the dependent variable was 
collected in October 2008, a time when the Republican incumbent president (George W. Bush) 
had largely ceded the political spotlight to the two candidates for president (John McCain and 
Barack Obama), both of whom were highly critical of the Bush Administration’s handling of U.S. 
foreign policy. This may have mitigated, to some extent, the effects of partisanship on 
assessments of U.S. standing. Nonetheless, despite this latter inconsistency, the overall results 
from the CCAP analysis are largely supportive of our theoretical predictions, offering fairly clear 




Our findings suggest that foreign policy worldviews may be a more powerful predictor of 
how Americans think about the U.S. role in the world and particularly U.S. standing in the world 
than previous research suggests. While ANES data going back to 1958 suggest that party ID is a 
powerful predictor of attitudes toward U.S. standing, the causal variables at work behind this 
correlation may be worldviews, especially when one takes into account differences in individual 
Americans’ capacities and incentives to apply such worldviews.  
 
  We predicted that by treating worldview as an information shortcut, or heuristic cue, 
similar in some ways to party identification, we might gain insight into who would likely rely on 
worldviews in assessing U.S. standing and when they were most likely to do so. Our results 
largely conform to our predictions. Because worldview is a more complex and less widely 
accessible heuristic cue than party ID, it is more readily available to political sophisticates who   21 
are most likely to possess the knowledge and context necessary for applying it. However, given 
that all human beings are cognitive misers, even sophisticates are likely to prefer “cheaper” 
heuristics when they can afford to do so. Hence, we anticipated that the most likely users of 
worldview would be political sophisticates from the non-presidential party. After all, when the 
president shares one’s party affiliation, it is likely that he or she will pursue policies consistent 
with one’s interests. Under such circumstances, one need not resort to the relatively “costly” 
heuristic of worldview. Conversely, less politically sophisticated individuals are likely to be 
dependent on more simple heuristics, like party ID.  
 
Our results largely bore out these expectations. We found that all respondents use party 
ID as a convenient heuristic to determine attitudes toward U.S. standing. Other studies (see 
above citations) show that domestic political ideology is a factor affecting some attitudes toward 
foreign policy. But these studies rely on limited definitions of domestic ideology and foreign 
policy attitudes. A broader definition of the independent variable in terms of foreign policy 
worldviews captures more of the variance in explaining attitudes toward U.S. standing in the 
world. Across our four data sets, nationalists, neoconservatives and some realists who are 
Republican tend to think about U.S. standing in the world more in terms of power and values, 
while liberal internationalists and some realists who are Democrats assess it more in terms of 
diplomacy and multilateralism. When a respondent’s own party is in power, that respondent, 
whether politically knowledgeable or not, assesses U.S. standing under that president primarily 
based on shared partisanship. When the respondent’s party is in opposition, however, politically 
knowledgeable respondents, far more than their less-knowledgeable counterparts, assess U.S. 
standing in significant measure in terms of worldviews, distrusting the incumbent president not 
just because s/he is from the opposite party but because s/he holds a different worldview that, in 
their view, potentially damages U.S. standing in the world.    
 
The implications for the study of foreign policy attitudes are potentially profound. By 
reconceptualizing worldview as a heuristic cue, we are able to advance the study of foreign 
policy attitudes, pioneered by scholars such as Holsti, Rosenau, Wittkopf and Maggiotto by 
predicting not only which worldviews are likely to influence foreign policy attitudes, but also 
who is likely to employ worldviews in rendering such assessments, and when they are likely to 
do so. 
 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevented us from fully elaborating the differences in 
worldviews across different types of survey respondents, as well as tracing the effects of 
worldviews over time. There are two types of data that would help us pursue this line of inquiry 
further. First, it would be helpful to identify other polls that ask consistent questions about party, 
ideology, word views and U.S. standing over a longer period of time. Second, it would be helpful 
to identify data regarding non-American respondents’ attitudes toward the standing of other great 
powers, rather than just toward the standing of the United States. These data would help us 
assess whether attitudes toward U.S. standing are more or less negative and influenced by the 
same or different factors, than attitudes toward the standing of other powers. 
 
With respect to this latter question, were able to undertake one preliminary test using Pew 
Global Attitudes Surveys for 2002 and 2005-2008. We compared favorability ratings of the 
United States and China along with a measure of US/China relative power. The results are shown   22 
in Figure 3. The top chart in Figure 3 measures attitudes among a constant set of three countries 
– Russia, Japan, and Indonesia -- for each year, while the bottom chart in Figure 3 measures 
attitudes across all available countries for each year. The individual countries whose evaluations 
of the U.S. and China are included in the samples vary modestly from year to year, though they 
are similar for all years except 2002. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
We find that U.S. favorability ratings declined precipitously in 2002-2006 and then began 
to recover in 2008. China's favorability ratings move consistently downward throughout the 
series. During this period, U.S. relative power – that is, GDP as a share of global GDP -- is 
clearly declining relative to China, albeit not dramatically so. We observe a powerful inverse 
relationship between U.S. relative power and attitudes toward China (as China's power rises, its 
favorability declines), but a somewhat less powerful relationship between U.S. relative power 
and attitudes toward the U.S. Since this is bivariate analysis, with an N of 5 yearly comparisons, 
these are at most suggestive findings. After all, any number of potential exogenous factors could 
account for the U.S. drop in favorability in the 2002-06 period, most notably the globally 
unpopular war in Iraq. Hence, if one were to cherry pick among potential exogenous factors, this 
could be interpreted as consistent with the argument that people tend to resent a hegemon, 
regardless of that nation’s actions. After all, once Iraq (as an irritant to U.S. prestige abroad) is 
removed from the system, the trends become consistent with a realist perspective given declining 
U.S. relative power (that is, rising favorability for the U.S.). Of course, discounting the 2002-06 
period due to Iraq, when U.S. power is declining along with its favorability, would constitute 
cherry picking of the data. While Iraq may account for this, we cannot establish such a 
relationship with these limited data. So we cannot really draw strong conclusions here. We thus 
leave this task for future research.   23 
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TABLE 1. Four Worldviews 
Worldview  Foreign Policy Preferences 
Nationalists (includes Holsti’s isolationists, see 
Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 
1996, 104) 
Independence (unilateralism for conservatives; 
non-intervention for liberals), homeland 
(including missile) defense, self-reliance, respect 
for American power (conservative) or values 
(liberal) 
Realists (includes Holsti’s accommodationists)  Active alliances, peace through strength, world 
order/stability, prudence (co-existence), moral 
relativism, equilibrium (defensive), hegemony 
(offensive) 
Conservative Internationalists (includes Holsti’s 
hardliners and neoconservatives) 
Reduce tyranny (not just coexist or cooperate 
with it), spread freedom (regime change), forceful 
diplomacy, preempt threats militarily 
Liberal Internationalists (includes Holsti’s 
internationalists) 
strengthen legitimacy of universal institutions 
(multilateralism), human rights, disarmament, 
fight poverty and disease to preempt threats 
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TABLE 2. Correlations Between Worldviews, Party ID, 
Ideology, and Iraq Support 









Ideology (Con-to-Lib)  -.41     
Party (Rep-to-Dem)   -.68  .45   
Liberal Internationalist  -.19  .18  .20 
Nationalist   .18  -.22  -.13 
Realist   .24  -.25  -.18 
Neoconservative   .57  -.36  -.44 
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TABLE 3: Probability of thinking U.S. less 
respected and this is a major problem, by 
worldview (Pew 2004) 
  Min.  Max.  Difference 
Liberal Internationalist  .040  .534  .494** 
Realist  .040  .169  .129* 
Nationalist  .040  .368  .328** 
Neocon  .040  .006  -.034* 
^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01; Note: “Min” means lowest 
score on a given worldview scale; “Max” means 
highest score on a given worldview scale. 
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TABLE 4: Probability of thinking U.S. less 
respected and this is a major problem, by 
worldview, as political attention increases from its 
minimum to maximum value (Pew 2004) 
  Min.  Max.  Difference 
Liberal Internationalist  .131  .921  .790^ 
Realist  .169  .951  .782* 
Nationalist  .849  .569  -.280 (insig) 
Neocon  .569  .307  -.263 (insig) 
^p<.10, *p<.05 
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TABLE 5. Probability Respondent Believes U.S. Has Grown 
Weaker Than in Past 
         
  Liberal Intl'ist  Realists/Trad'list  Diff   
By Political Knowledge         
1. Republicans         
Low political info  0.22  0.37  0.15  ** 
High political info  0.03  0.45  0.42  ** 
2. Democrats         
Low political info  0.33  0.25  -0.08  ** 
High political info  0.48  0.12  -0.36  ** 
3. Conservative         
Low political info  0.18  0.34  0.16  ** 
High political info  0.03  0.55  0.52  ** 
4. Liberal         
Low political info  0.38  0.27  -0.11  * 
High political info  0.62  0.11  -0.51  * 
         
By Administration         
5. Conservative         
Clinton 96  0.13  0.64  0.51  ** 
Bush 04  0.29  0.11  -0.18   
6. Liberal         
Clinton 96  0.16  0.22  0.06   
Bush 04  0.85  0.52  -0.33   
7. Republicans         
Clinton 96  0.23  0.54  0.31  ^ 
Bush 04  0.19  0.12  -0.07   
8. Democrats         
Clinton 96  0.13  0.24  0.11   
Bush 04  0.92  0.29  -0.63  ** 
^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01       
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TABLE 6. Correlation Between 
Nationalist Worldview and Believing 
U.S. Weaker than in the Past 
  Overall 
Clinton (1996)   
   Democrats  .10 
   Republicans  .19 
   Liberals  .08 
   Conservatives  .24 
Bush (2004)   
   Democrats  -.23 
   Republicans  -.02 
   Liberals  -.16 
   Conservatives  -.02 
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TABLE 7. Probability that Respondent Believes the U.S. is Weaker or Stronger than in the Past, as Party 
ID, Ideology, Political Knowledge and Administration Vary (1996 vs. 2004 ANES) 
  Probability U.S. Weaker    Probability U.S. Stronger   
CLINTON '96  Liberal Int’list  Realist/Trad'list  Diff    Liberal Int’list  Realist/Trad'list  Diff   
1. Republicans                 
Lo political info  0.39  0.47  0.08  ^  0.14  0.09  -0.05  ^ 
Hi political info  0.04  0.32  0.28  ^  0.74  0.2  -0.54  ^ 
2. Democrats                 
Lo political info  0.11  0.14  0.03    0.45  0.39  -0.06   
Hi political info  0.09  0.22  0.13    0.55  0.29  -0.26   
3. Conservative                 
Lo political info  0.23  0.5  0.27  **  0.26  0.09  -0.17  ** 
Hi political info  0.01  0.46  0.45  **  0.96  0.13  -0.83  ** 
4. Liberal                 
Lo political info  0.15  0.16  0.01    0.37  0.36  -0.01   
Hi political info  0.32  0.33  0.01    0.24  0.22  -0.02   
                 
BUSH '04  Liberal Int’list  Realist/Trad'list  Diff    Liberal Int’list  Realist/Trad'list  Diff   
5. Republicans                 
Lo political info  0.23  0.21  -0.02    0.43  0.47  0.04   
Hi political info  0.26  0.15  -0.11    0.45  0.61  0.16   
6. Democrats                 
Lo political info  0.77  0.61  -0.16  **  0.06  0.13  0.07  ** 
Hi political info  0.74  0.08  -0.66  **  0.08  0.73  0.65  ** 
7. Conservative                 
Lo political info  0.36  0.24  -0.12    0.3  0.43  0.13   
Hi political info  0.64  0.17  -0.47    0.18  0.6  0.42   
8. Liberal                 
Lo political info  0.77  0.71  -0.06    0.06  0.09  0.03   
Hi political info  0.33  0.13  -0.2    0.41  0.68  0.27   
^p<.10, **p<.01                 
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TABLE 8. Effects of Party, Ideology, and Foreign Policy Views on Perceptions of U.S. Standing, 
2008 ANES 
  (1) Party  (2) Ideology 
Democrat  1.847 (1.060)^  ------- 
Republican  1.367 (1.090)  ------- 
Liberal  -------  .907 (1.22) 
Conservative  -------  -.441 (.98) 
Party ID  -------  .558 (.17)** 
Ideology (liberal to conservative)  .135 (.095)  ------- 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Democrat  -.052 (.066)  ------- 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Republican  .036 (.066)  ------- 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Independent  .028 (.063)  ------- 
Political Information/Intelligence x Democrat  -.137 (.051)**  ------- 
Political Information/Intelligence x Republican  .013 (.041)  ------- 
Political Information/Intelligence x Independent  .047 (.048)  ------- 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x 
Information/Intelligence x Democrat 
.006 (.005)  ------- 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x 
Information/Intelligence x Republican 
-.004 (.004)  ------- 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x 
Information/Intelligence x Independent 
-.0042 (.005)  ------- 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Liberal  -------  -.0665 (.073) 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Conservative  -------  .0405 (.054) 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x Moderate  -------  -.008 (.066) 
Political Information/Intelligence x Liberal  -------  -.134 (.079)^ 
Political Information/Intelligence x Conservative  -------  .036 (.036) 
Political Information/Intelligence x Moderate  -------  -.018 (.052) 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x 
Information/Intelligence x Liberal 
-------  .007 (.006) 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x 
Information/Intelligence x Conservative 
-------  -.004 (.003) 
Liberalist Internationalist-to-Nationalist Scale x 
Information/Intelligence x Moderate 
-------  -.0002 (.0044) 
Age  -.014 (.007)^  -.012 (.0073) 
Education  -.065 (.045)  -.062 (.045) 
Trust in Government Scale  .445 (.20)*  .441 (.200)* 
Constant  -3.022 (1.06)**  -2.672 (1.070)* 
Observations  1262  1262 
R-squared  .08  .07 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.10; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   34 
 
TABLE 9. Probability that Respondent Believes the U.S. is Weaker or Stronger 
than in the Past, as Party ID, Ideology, Political Sophistication and 
Administration Vary (2008 ANES) 
BY PARTY         
Low Sophistication 
Liberal 
Internationalist  Nationalist  diff   
Democrats  0.089  0.077  -0.012   
Republicans  0.142  0.164  0.022   
Independents  0.051  0.049  -0.002   
         
High Sophistication      diff   
Democrats  0.016  0.044  0.028  ^ 
Republicans  0.151  0.093  -0.058  ^ 
Independents  0.083  0.041  -0.042  ^^ 
         
Low Sophistication  Democrats  Republicans  diff   
Liberal Internationalist  0.089  0.142  0.053   
Nationalist  0.077  0.164  0.087  ^^ 
         
High Sophistication      diff   
Liberal Internationalist  0.016  0.151  0.135  ** 
Nationalist  0.044  0.093  0.049  ^ 
         
BY IDEOLOGY         
Low Sophistication 
Liberal 
Internationalist  Nationalist  diff   
Liberals  0.095  0.075  -0.02   
Conservatives  0.077  0.088  0.011   
Moderates  0.083  0.071  -0.012   
         
High Sophistication      diff   
Liberals  0.022  0.058  0.036  ^^ 
Conservatives  0.108  0.057  -0.051  * 
Moderates  0.064  0.056  -0.008   
         
Low Sophistication  Liberals  Conservatives  diff   
Liberal Internationalist  0.095  0.105  0.01   
Nationalist  0.075  0.096  0.021   
         
         
High Sophistication      diff   
Liberal Internationalist  0.021  0.038  0.017   
Nationalist  0.058  0.053  -0.005   
**p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.10, ^^p<.15 
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TABLE 10. MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF PARTY AND FOREIGN 
POLICY VIEWS ON PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. STANDING, CCAP 2008 
  Fallen because  
of America’s 
Actions 




Better than  
10 years ago 
Democrat  -2.792 (3.25)  -1.923 (4.04)  11.68 (13.0) 
Republican  -27.06 (1.00)**  -21.46 (9.80)*  -7.615 (16.5) 
Nationalist Scale x Democrat  2.218 (1.14)^  2.167 (1.58)  3.363 (1.57)* 
Nationalist Scale x Republican  13.11 (4.96)**  9.975 (4.84)*  11.34 (5.90)^ 
Nationalist Scale x Independent  -1.573 (1.54)  -2.084 (1.60)  4.390 (6.70) 
Liberal Internationalist Scale x Democrat  1.025 (1.07)  .008 (1.49)  -.626 (1.88) 
Liberal Internationalist Scale x 
Republican 
13.28 (4.75)**  11.36 (4.71)*  11.20 (5.75)^ 
Liberal Internationalist Scale x 
Independent 
-.424 (1.01)  -.858 (1.21)  23.11 (3.61)*** 
Political Information x Democrat  1.526 (1.30)  .328 (1.64)  1.955 (1.24) 
Political Information x Republican  9.593 (3.63)**   7.532 (3.60)*   8.406 (4.64)^  
Political Information x Independent  .537 (.98)  -.134 (1.12)  5.778 (4.44) 
Nationalist Scale x Democrat x Political 
Information 
-1.299 (.61)*  -1.049 (.80)  -1.758 (.80)* 
Nationalist Scale x Republican x Political 
Information 
-5.159 (1.84)**  -3.694 (1.83)*  -4.587 (2.26)* 
Nationalist Scale x Independent x Political 
Information 
-.111 (.71)  .612 (.74)  -1.890 (2.39) 
Liberal Internationalist Scale x Democrat 
x Political Information 
-.256 (.49)  -.256 (.73)  -.138 (.68) 
Liberal Internationalist Scale x 
Republican x Political Information 
-4.456 (1.71)**  -4.130 (1.74)*  -4.395 (2.17)* 
Liberal Internationalist Scale x 
Independent x Political Information 
.779 (.50)  .384 (.57)  -212.6 (15.7)*** 
Education  .066 (.12)  -.187 (.12)  .0288 (.26) 
Male  -.338 (.35)  -.328 (.35)  -.143 (.71) 
Ideology (liberal to conservative)  -.366 (.22)^  -.167 (.22)  .512 (.48) 
Constant  3.404 (2.06)^  3.427 (2.37)  -17.37 (13.3) 
Observations  609     
R-squared  .33     
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.10; Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Note: omitted category is “America’s standing in the world is about the same as it was 10 years ago.”   36 
 
TABLE 11. Effects of Party ID, Political Sophistication and Worldview on 
Attitudes Regarding U.S. Standing (2008 CCAP) 





Traditionalist  Difference 
US Standing over past 10 years         
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)  0.585  0.335  -0.250   
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)  0.206  0.447  0.241   
same (3)  0.169  0.024  -0.145  ^ 
better (4)  0.041  0.194  0.153   
         
Republicans         
US Standing over past 10 years         
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)  0.256  0.424  0.168   
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)  0.381  0.202  -0.179   
same (3)  0.201  0.154  -0.047   
better (4)  0.162  0.220  0.058   
         
Independents         
US Standing over past 10 years         
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)  0.538  0.312  -0.226   
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)  0.265  0.133  -0.132   
same (3)  0.195  0.509  0.314   
better (4)  0.001  0.045  0.044   
         
MAXIMUM POLITICAL INFORMATION       
Democrats         
US Standing over past 10 years         
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)  0.915  0.513  -0.402  ^^ 
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)  0.010  0.118  0.108  ^ 
same (3)  0.020  0.258  0.238  * 
better (4)  0.058  0.110  0.052   
         
Republicans         
US Standing over past 10 years         
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)  0.876  0.132  -0.744  ** 
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)  0.075  0.602  0.527  ** 
same (3)  0.039  0.248  0.209  ^ 
better (4)  0.010  0.018  0.008   
         
Independents         
US Standing over past 10 years         
fallen b/c of U.S. actions (1)  0.993  0.209  -0.784  ** 
fallen NOT b/c of U.S. actions (2)  0.006  0.519  0.513  ** 
same (3)  0.001  0.184  0.183  ** 
better (4)  0.000  0.089  0.089  **   37 
 
         
MINIMUM POLITICAL INFORMATION       
Liberal Internationalists  Democrats  Republicans  Difference   
US Standing over past 10 years         
fallen b/c of actions (1)  0.582  0.235  -0.347   
fallen NOT b/c of actions (2)  0.214  0.408  0.194   
same (3)  0.164  0.178  0.014   
better (4)  0.039  0.178  0.139   
         
Nationalists         
US Standing over past 10 years         
fallen b/c of actions (1)  0.334  0.009  -0.325  * 
fallen NOT b/c of actions (2)  0.491  0.023  -0.468  ^ 
same (3)  0.117  0.928  0.811  * 
better (4)  0.057  0.040  -0.017   
         
MAXIMUM POLITICAL INFORMATION       
Liberal Internationalists         
US Standing over past 10 years         
fallen b/c of actions (1)  0.926  0.880  -0.046   
fallen NOT b/c of actions (2)  0.010  0.072  0.062  ^ 
same (3)  0.016  0.039  0.023   
better (4)  0.048  0.009  -0.039   
         
Nationalists         
US Standing over past 10 years         
fallen b/c of actions (1)  0.086  0.002  -0.084  * 
fallen NOT b/c of actions (2)  0.082  0.020  -0.062   
same (3)  0.809  0.966  0.157 
^
^ 
better (4)  0.024  0.012  -0.012   
**p<.01, *p<.05, ^p<.10, ^^p<.15   38 
Appendix: Data Coding 
 
TABLE A1: Four Worldviews 
Question   Question Text  Response Categories 
32  What kind of leadership role should the 
United States play in the world? Should 
it be the single world leader, or should 
it play a shared leadership role, or 
shouldn't it play any leadership role? 
1=Single leader, 2=Shared leadership, 3=No 
leadership, and 9=Don't know/Refused 
33  IF "SHARED LEADERSHIP 
ROLE" (2 IN Q.32), ASK: Should the 
United States be the most active of the 
leading nations, or should it be about as 
active as other leading nations? 
1=Most active, 2=About as active, and 9=Don't 
know/Refused 
34  Should the United States base its 
foreign policy mostly on the interests of 
the U.S., or should it strongly take into 
account the interests of its allies? 
1=own estimates of national interests, 
2=interests and views of allies, 3=both 
37  Do you think that using military force 
against countries that may seriously 
threaten our country, but have not 
attacked us, can often, sometimes, 
rarely or never be justified? 
1=often, 2=sometimes, 3=rarely, 4=never 
39  From this list of long range U.S. foreign 
policy goals, which do you think should 
have top priority, some priority, or no 
priority at all? 
1.  Taking measures to protect the U.S. from 
terrorist attacks  
2.  Preventing the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction  
3.  Insuring adequate energy supplies for the 
U.S.  
4.  Strengthening the United Nations  
5.  Reducing the spread of AIDS and other 
infectious diseases  
6.  Protecting groups or nations that are 
threatened with genocide  
7.  Promoting democracy in other nations 
8.  Promoting U.S. business and economic 
interests abroad 
9.  Finding a solution to the conflict between 
Israel and the Palestinians 
42  Do you think this should be a top 
priority, some priority, or no priority at 
all in the way we conduct our foreign 
policy 
1.  compassionate  
2.  practical  
3.  decisive  
4.  cautious  
5.  following moral principles  
45  Do you think that we should increase 
our spending on national defense, keep 
it about the same, or cut it back? 
1=increase, 2=same, 3=cut back 
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TABLE A2: Elements and Coding of Worldview Scales 
Worldview  Scale Coding, by Question 
Nationalists  Q32 & Q33: No Leadership (Q32) 
Q34: Own estimates of national interests 
Q37: never 
Q39: protect against terrorist attacks, Prevent spread of WMD, Insure 
adequate energy supplies 
Q42: Cautious 
Q45: Increase defense spending 
Realists  Q32 & Q33: Shared Leadership (Q32) & Most Active (Q33) 
Q34: Both Interest and Views of Allies and Own Estimates of National 
Interests 
Q37: sometimes 
Q39: protect against terrorist attacks, Prevent spread of WMD, Insure 
adequate energy supplies, Promoting U.S. business and economic interests 
abroad 
Q42: Practical, Cautious 
Q45: About the same defense spending 
Neoconservatives  Q32 & Q33: Single Leader (Q32)  & Most Active (Q33) 
Q34: Own estimates of national interests 
Q37: Often 
Q39: protect against terrorist attacks, Prevent spread of WMD, Insure 
adequate energy supplies, Promoting democracy, Promoting U.S. business 
and economic interests abroad 
Q42: Decisive, Follow moral principles 
Q45: Increase defense spending 
Liberal 
Internationalists 
Q32 & Q33: Shared leadership (Q32)  & About as active (Q33) 
Q34: Interests and views of allies 
Q37: Rarely 
Q39: Strengthen United Nations, Reduce spread of AIDS, Protect against 
genocide, Promoting democracy, Find solution to Israel-Palestinian conflict 
Q42: Compassionate, Practical, Follow moral principles 
Q45: Cut back defense spending 
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Q30  Do you approve or disapprove of the way George 




Q60  Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the 
wrong decision in using military force against Iraq? 
1=right decision, 0=wrong 
decision, .5=don’t 
know/refused 
Q61  How well is the U.S. military effort in Iraq going?  1=not at all well, 2= not 
too well, 3=fairly well, 4= 
very well, 2.5=don’t 
know/refused (recoded to 
0-1 interval) 
Q62  Do you think the U.S. should keep military troops in 
Iraq until the situation has stabilized, or do you think 
the U.S. should bring its troops home as soon as 
possible? 




Q63  Do you think George W. Bush has a clear plan for 
bringing the situation in Iraq to a successful 
conclusion, or don’t you think so? 
1=has a clear plan, 
0=doesn’t have a clear 
plan, .5=don’t 
know/refused 
Q64  Do you think the war in Iraq has helped the war on 
terrorism, or has it hurt the war on terrorism? 
1=helped, 0=hurt, .5=don’t 
know/refused 
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VCF0823  'This country would be better off if we just stayed home and 









VCF0843  Some people believe that we should spend much less money 
for defense. (1996,2004: Suppose these people are at one 
end of a scale, at point 1.) Others feel that defense spending 
should be greatly increased. (1996,2004: Suppose these 
people are at the other end, at point 7.) (2004: And, of 
course, some other people have opinions somewhere in 
between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6). Where would you place 
yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about 
this? 








7.  Greatly increase 
defense spending. 
(7=Nationalist, 6-5 
Neocon, 4-3 Realist, 1-2 
=Liberal Internationalist) 
VCF0853  'This country would have many fewer problems if there 
were more emphasis on traditional family ties.' (2004: do 
you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor 
disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with this 
statement?) 
1.  Agree strongly 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neither agree nor 
disagree or DK 
4.  Disagree somewhat 




VCF0854  'We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live 
according to their own moral standards, even if they are very 
different from our own.' Do you agree strongly, agree 
somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, 
or disagree strongly with this statement? 
1.  Agree strongly 
2.  Agree somewhat 
3.  Neither agree nor 
disagree or DK 
4.  Disagree somewhat 
5.  Disagree strongly 
(1=Nationalist, 2-3 Realist, 
4 Neocon, 5=Liberal 
Internationalist) 
VCF0879  Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign 
countries who are permitted to come to the United States to 
live should be (1992,1994:  increased a little, increased a lot, 
decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is 
now?) (1996,1998: increased a lot, increased a little, 
1.  Increased a lot 
2.  Increased a little 
3.  Same as now or DK 
4.  Decreased a little 
5.  Decreased a lot   42 
decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is 
now?) (2004: increased a lot, increased a little, left the same 
as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?) 
 




VCF0892  If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, 
for which (of the following) programs would you like to see 
spending increased and for which would you like to see 
spending decreased: Should federal spending on Foreign 
Aid be increased, decreased or kept about the same? 
1.   Increased 
2.   Same or DK 
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What is the most important 






















Nationalists – Score=1 if 
respondent selected any of 
the following: war in Iraq, 
terrorism, corruption in 
government, energy 
supplies, economy and jobs, 
rising prices, immigration, 
crime, drug abuse, taxes, 
abortion, gay marriage. 
 
Liberal internationalists – 
Score=1 if respondent 
selected any of the 
following: education, health 
care, energy supplies, 
economy and jobs, poverty, 
housing, social security and 
pensions, pollution and 
environment 
When it comes to America's 
image abroad, there are two 
viewpoints concerning what 
would be better to improve 
America's image in other 
countries. Which viewpoint 
comes closer to your own? 
(1) We need a president who will 
present an image that America has 
a more open approach and is 
willing to negotiate with friends 
and foes alike 
(2) We need a president who will 
present an image of strength that 
shows America's willingness to 
confront our enemies and stand up 
for our principles 
(3) Not Sure/Neither 
1=Liberal 
Internationalist/Realist 
2=Nationalist/Neocon   44   45 
 
FIGURE 2. Holstiʼs (1996) MI/CI Matrix   46 
 
FIGURE 3. U.S. and China Favorability Ratings, as U.S. Share of 
Global GDP Varies, 2002-08 
 
 
 